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Abstract: The Internet-of-Things (IoT) enables enterprises to obtain profits from data but triggers 
data protection questions and new types of cyber risk. Cyber risk regulations for the IoT however 
do not exist. The IoT risk is not included in the cyber security assessment standards, hence, often 
not visible to cyber security experts. This is concerning, because companies integrating IoT devices 
and services need to perform a self-assessment of its IoT cyber security posture. The outcome of 
such self-assessment needs to define a current and target state, prior to creating a transformation 
roadmap outlining tasks to achieve the stated target state. In this article, a comparative empirical 
analysis is performed of multiple cyber risk assessment approaches, to define a high-level potential 
target state for company integrating IoT devices and/or services. Defining a high-level potential 
target state represent is followed by a high-level transformation roadmap, describing how company 
can achieve their target state, based on their current state. The transformation roadmap is used to 
adapt IoT risk impact assessment with a Goal-Oriented Approach and the Internet of Things Micro 
Mart model.  
Keywords: Internet of Things; Micro Mart model; Goal-Oriented Approach; transformation 
roadmap; Cyber risk regulations; empirical analysis; cyber risk self-assessment; cyber risk target 
state 
 
1 Introduction 
Economic impact of Internet-of-Things (IoT) cyber risk is increasing with the integration of 
digital infrastructure in the digital economy 1. Cyber security standardisation and regulation would 
play a key role in the process of reducing cyber-attacks while continuing to harness the economic 
values.  
The cyber risk from IoT devices is present across different and sometimes at a higher level in 
sectors where such risk is unexpected. For example, in the US, healthcare is now the largest target of 
cyber security attacks, reportedly at greater risk than manufacturing and banking 2. According to the 
same report 2, the value of stolen personal health information is ten to twenty times greater than the 
value of a stolen credit card number. To understand and define a generic target state for cyber 
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maturity, we need to understand the business context and the cyber risk priorities through 
discussions between cyber security experts and decision makers 3.   
This research article conducts epistemological analysis focused on understanding the best 
approach for increasing safety, security and economic value in the IoT space. Our research has two 
objectives. To identify and capture a high-level target state for the mitigation of cyber risk from the 
IoT, and to adapt existing cyber security practices and standards to include IoT cyber risk in a high-
level cyber security transformation roadmap. We discuss and expand on these further in the 
remainder of this article. In Section 2 we present the research methodology. 
2 Methodology  
There is a strong interest in regulating the cyber risk assessment procedures. Regulation and 
standardisation of cyber security frameworks, models and methodologies has not been done until 
present. Standardisation in this article refers to the compounding of knowledge to advance the efforts 
on integrating cyber risk standards and governance, and to offer a better understanding of cyber risk 
assessments. Here we combine literature analysis with an empirical with a comparative analysis. The 
empirical analysis is conducted with seven cyber risk frameworks and two cyber risk models. The 
comparative analysis engages with fifteen high-tech national strategies.  
3 Current state of cyber risk  
Current cyber risk trends are based on risk from intelligent manufacturing equipment, artificial 
intelligence, the cloud, and IoT, creating risk from systems of machines capable of interacting with 
the cyber-physical world 4,5. The integration of new technologies creates cyber security risk, e.g. 
integrating less secured systems 6 in manufacturing 7 and supply chains 8–12. Existing cyber risk 
assessment models 13–19 ignore the risk impacts of sharing infrastructure and the cyber risk estimated 
loss range variously 1. Further cyber risk assessment challenges emerge from compiling of connected 
systems devices and platforms 4,20. The machines are becoming social CPS 21–23 operating as real-time 
IoT systems of systems 24,25, creating cyber risk from data in transit. This requires standardisation of 
design and process 15,26 because such system security is complex.  
4 Uncovering the best method to define a unified cyber risk assessment through a 
comparative empirical research study 
4.1 Comparative study of IoT in Industry 4.0 
From this comparative study, the main IoT risk elements of each IoT strategy are compounded 
into categories representing the most prominent IoT cyber risk vectors (see Table 1). However, the 
compelling of data into these categories is quite challenging, as some strategies, represent a collection 
of descriptive explanations and do not provide explicit IoT cyber risk vectors. Such descriptive 
explanations present complexities in developing a unifying strategy. To resolve this issue, we use the 
grounded theory methodology, where most prominent IoT cyber risk vectors are categorised and 
used as reference themes. Then, the categories are used for examining IoT cyber risk, to define a 
standardisation approach that relates various IoT risk vectors to eliminate conflicts in different and 
sometimes contrasting assessments of risk vectors.  
4.2 Empirical analysis of gaps in cyber risk impact assessment approaches  
The empirical analysis aims to identify cyber security frameworks and to compare interlinkages 
with the IoT risk in the Industry 4.0. Some of the frameworks reviewed propose diverse qualitative 
methods, and some qualitative approaches for measuring cyber risk propose methodologies27–31.  
The most advanced cyber risk impact assessment framework is the US NIST 32. The NIST 
framework argues that to reach the required cyber security maturity level, the current cyber state can 
be transformed into a given a target cyber state by applying a specific cyber security framework 
implementation guidance 33. However, the NIST guidance is specifically designed for Federal 
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Agencies and requires adaptations to be applicable to enterprises. The NIST framework requires 
determining a detailed current cyber profile and a maturity level but does not provide a model for 
these steps.  
The CVSS calculator 34,35 could be used to create a current cyber profile, in addition to the Exostar 
system 36 for determining the supply chain cyber maturity level, and CMMI 37 the overall current state 
of cyber maturity. The final gap in the NIST framework is the lack of cyber risk quantitative 
assessment, which is crucial for making an informed and detailed recommendations for a target cyber 
profile. The Factor Analysis of Information Risk Institute (FAIR) 38 aims to address this gap in the 
NIST framework. FAIR Institute adapts existing quantitative models, e.g. RiskLens 39, and Cyber VaR 
(CyVaR) 40. In a way, FAIR is complementing the work of NIST and the International Organisation 
for Standardisation (ISO) 41, which is the international standard-setting body and includes cyber risk 
standards. Notable for this discussion, only FAIR 38 provides recommendations for quantitative risk 
estimation. To complete the risk assessment, the cyber risk from supply chains needs to be simplified 
31,42,43. To identify a current cyber risk state that includes supply chain cyber risks, the Exostar system 
36, can be used for complimenting the CVSS and covering the supply chain aspect of cyber risk. 
Further analysis, including SWAT and GAP analysis are considered beyond the scope of this 
conference paper, but can be found in other articles 43–47.  
4.3 Transformation roadmap for standardisation of IoT risk impact assessment 
To define a transformation roadmap for standardisation of IoT risk impact assessment, the 
methodology follows recently established approaches 1,4,5,44,47–49. The design principles define how to 
identify, manage, estimate, and prioritise cyber risk (Table 1).  
Vectors FAIR CMMI CVSS ISO NIST Octave TARA 
Risk 
identification 
(measure) 
Financial  Maturity 
models 
Base metrics ISO 27032  Categorising  Workshops Threat Matrix 
Risk 
management 
(standardise) 
Compliance ISO 15504 - 
SPICE 
Mathematical 
approximation  
ISO 27001  Assembling Repeatability Template 
threats 
Risk 
estimation 
(compute) 
Quantitative Maturity 
levels 
Qualitative Compliance  Compliance  Qualitative Qualitative  
Risk 
prioritisation 
(strategy) 
Level of 
exposure 
N/A N/A ISO 27031  Compliance Impact areas  System 
recovery  
 
Table 1: High level target state for standardisation of IoT risk impact assessment 
In Table 1, the resulting definition of transformation roadmap are reduced in content with the 
controlled convergence methods 31. 
5 Case study research  
5.1 The case study  
The case study research involved four workshops that included 18 distinguished engineers from 
Cisco Systems, and 2 distinguished engineers from Fujitsu. The workshops with Cisco Systems were 
conducted in the USA in four different Cisco research centres. These centres were as follows: First 
Centre - Security and Trust Organisation; Second Centre - Advanced Services; Third Centre - Security 
Business Group; and Fourth Centre - Cisco Research Centre. In pursuit of validity, a separate 
workshop was conducted with two experts from Fujitsu centre for Artificial Intelligence the UK. The 
Fujitsu workshop was conducted separately to avoid those experts being influenced or outspoken by 
the larger group from Cisco systems.  
The first two Cisco workshops were conducted to apply the controlled convergence 9,31. This 
approach to pursuing validity follows existing literature on this topics 50,51 and provides clear 
definitions that specify the units of analysis for IoT cyber risk vectors. The IoT risk units of analysis 
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from individual IoT strategy are combined into standardisation vectors. The process of defining the 
standardisation vectors followed the controlled convergence method 8,52, where experts were asked 
to confirm the valid concept, merge duplicated concepts, and delete conflicting concepts. The main 
limitation of the Pugh controlled convergence method is the difficulty in gathering large number of 
experts in one location.  
5.2 Transformation imperatives describing how IoT companies can achieve their target state based on their 
current state with a Goal-Oriented approach  
Following the identification of a high-level target state in the comparative empirical analysis, the 
controlled convergence was applied to narrow the emerging implementation tasks through case 
study. The controlled convergence was applied for the development of a transformation roadmap for 
the high-level target state (Table 1). To build the transformation roadmap, the emerging categories 
are validated with applying the controlled convergence with a group of experts. The process of 
confirming validity of the data in Table 2, outlines the transformation process but does not include 
all the steps as the aim is to present a methodology, not the actions. The rationale is that different 
enterprises will have different cyber security steps to perform in order to transition to a higher 
maturity lever. A long and detailed list of steps can be found in some of our work in progress articles 
42,43,46.  
 
High level transformation imperatives 
Training and awareness  
Control goal (parent) 1: Security skills assessment and training 
Control objective (child) 1: Skills and integrated plan to support defence of the enterprise. 
Control element (orphan) 1: Analysis of needed skills; provide training to match the required skills and 
validate skills through periodic tests. More advanced control orphans include: security assessments using 
real-world examples to measure mastery or skills.  
Control goal (parent) 2: Penetration testing. 
Control objective (child) 2: Test the defences by simulating cyber-attacks. 
Control element (orphan) 2: Regular focussed penetration tests for detecting unprotected systems through 
vulnerability scanning and penetration testing combined. 
Control goal (parent) 3: Mobile device 
Control objective (child) 3: Mitigate cyber risk from mobile devices.  
Control element (orphan) 3: Mobile devices should have access controls to enforce policies and option to 
remotely clean the device.  
Cyber threat intelligence  
Control goal (parent) 1: Boundary defence 
Control objective (child) 1: Manage the flow of information between network trust levels. 
Control element (orphan) 1: Prevent communications with malicious IP addresses, use two-factor 
identification; design DMZ network and scan connections that aim to bypass the DMZ; block known bad 
signature or attack behaviour. 
Security event monitoring  
Notes: links with: (a) network security; (b) identity and access management. 
Control goal (parent) 1: Maintenance, monitoring and analysis of audit logs 
Control objective (child) 1: Collect, manage and analyse audit logs of events.  
Control element (orphan) 1: Two synchronised timestamps in logs to ensure consistency; develop a log 
retention policy. 
Control goal (parent) 2: Secure configurations for network devices such as firewalls, routers and switches 
Control objective (child) 2: Actively manage the security configuration of the network infrastructure. 
Control element (orphan) 2: Documenting all new configurations rules that allow traffic to flow through 
network security devices; use two-factor identification and encryption.  
Control goal (parent) 3: Account monitoring and control 
Control objective (child) 3: Control the life-cycle of system and application accounts.  
Control element (orphan) 3: Disable unused account; imprint accounts expiration date; enable revoking 
system access accounts; log-off users after a standard period of inactivity; encrypt transmitted passwords.  
Table 2: Transformation roadmap- describing examples of how IoT companies can achieve their target state based on their current state with a Goal-Oriented approach 
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For implementing the recommendations emerging from the transformational imperatives, we 
refer to the NIST cyber security implementation tiers as support guidance. These implementation 
steps are the prime focus of government and industry efforts for improving cyber security exposure. 
In the following section, the transformation roadmap and imperatives can be used to define a new 
IoT risk impact assessment with a goal-oriented approach and the Internet of Things Micro Mart 
model.  
6 IoT risk impact assessment with the transformation roadmap and imperatives 
Dependency goal-oriented modelling can be applied to connect unconnected risk models and to 
build a risk model for a complex IoT systems. The first step is to link separate models. This requires 
identifying the shared principles from the multiple models that we are connecting. Then, to 
determine the level of dependency risk, we need to understand the dependencies of the shared 
principles.  
6.1 IoT Risk Analysis through Functional Dependency 
Dependency modelling and analysis provides a means to support the management of functional 
and operational complexities within IoT systems with focus on the system elements, measures of a 
design or operational challenge, as well as the functional dependencies that define their associations. 
Dependency modelling and analysis can support a superior understanding of connectivity and its 
implications on performance, and can assist in constructing, improving, and maintaining of such 
complex system. The construct and exchanges that happen in IoT domain defines a tightly coupled 
association amongst constituting components and sub-systems such considerably on the correct 
functions of another linked component or system. This is considered a dependency relationship, and 
can either be direct (a first order dependency) or indirect (a subsequent higher order dependency) 53.  
For example, from a typical IoT architecture 54, normal functions for components and services on the 
application layer typically depend on the normal functioning of their counterparts on the network 
layer. This latter also relies on the perception layer component and services. If a component or service 
on the perception layer is compromised, such impairment can alter the correct functioning of 
connected component or service on the network or application layers. Thus, security risks in an IoT 
domain may not exactly be drawn from the failure of one specific IoT component, but most often 
extend to the failure of other IoT components that can be recipients of rippling impacts. This 
dependency amongst IoT sub-systems and components can also cause impacts or failures to cascade 
from one affected system or component onto another; worsening the damaging impacts 55,56. One way 
of achieving IoT dependency modelling is through a network-based functionality dimension – 
analysing how the functionality of one system or component can affect the functionalities of other 
systems or components 57, explorable on the basis of connectivity and process configurations over 
multi-layered IoT architecture. Graph theory 53,58 - using vertices and edges; provides a way to simply 
represent (directly or logically) the dependency of IoT components within and across multiple 
functionality layers.  
6.2 IoT risk impact assessment with a Goal-Oriented Approach 
Identifying shared principles for multiple independent cyber risk models is challenging, because 
risk assessment is not based on shared risk estimation. This can partially be resolved by focusing on 
the success factors and concentrating on the external dependencies. In this approach, individual risk 
vertices are considered as representative of a larger complex IoT system. This advocates a top-down, 
or goal-oriented modelling approach 31,46, where success factors are traversing across multiple 
isolated models. The paradigm can provide a real-time statistical assessment of cyber risk of all the 
entities in the model. The dependencies between a dynastic metaphor, such as ‘parent’, ‘child’, 
‘orphan’ are explained in the transformational roadmap, can be analysed with computational 
statistics using a Bayesian analysis engine 59,60.  
6.3 Micro Mort  
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Since there is no International IoT Asset Classification (IIoTAC) and no established Key IoT 
Cyber Risk Factors (KIoTCRF), for the calculations of the new model, we would firstly need to 
determine the IIoTAC and the KIoTCRF 1,5. After the establishment of IIoTAC and KIoTCRF, the new 
model could be applied to calculate more precise ‘willingness to pay’ to reduce IoT cyber risk. 
7 Conclusion  
This article combines existing literature and performs comparative, empirical and theoretical 
analysis of common cyber risk assessment approaches and integrates current standards. The findings 
present a map of the present initiatives, frameworks, methods and models for assessing the impact 
of cyber risk. Hence, the article advances the efforts of integrating cyber risk standards and 
governance and offers a better understanding of a holistic impact assessment approach for IoT cyber 
risk. This enables visualising the interactions among different sets of cyber security assessment 
criteria and results with a new design criterion specific for cyber risk from the IoT. The visualisation 
of cyber risk can be used by practitioners and regulators to inform organisations in this space of best 
practices. The design principles, with the transformational roadmap, can be applied to assess the 
impact of cyber compromises and to make cyber security recommendations. The findings are relevant 
to national and international Industry 4.0 networks, specifically for IoT cyber risk planning.  
7.1 Limitations and further research  
Holistic analysis of all risk assessment approaches was considered beyond the scope of this 
study. Additional research is required to integrate the knowledge from other studies. The 
epistemological framework in this article presents a generic approach to guide researchers and 
practitioners.  
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